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Abstract  
In this paper I evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced payroll 
taxes by 3–6 percentage points of the firms’ wage sum in northern and eastern 
Finland. I estimate the effect of the payroll tax reduction on firms’ employment 
levels, wage sum and profits, and on workers’ hourly pay and monthly hours 
worked, by comparing the changes in employment and wages before and after 
the start of the experiment to a control region. My results indicate that the 
reduction in payroll taxes did not lead to any unequivocal aggregate effects in the 
target region. 
Key words: payroll-tax, labour demand, tax incidence 
JEL classification: J18, J23, J38, J58, J65, J68  
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan Lapin ja Kainuun yritysten alueellisen sosiaali-
turvamaksuvapautuksen vaikutusta yritysten työllisyyteen, palkkasummaan ja 
voittoihin sekä näissä yrityksissä työskentelevien tuntipalkkoihin. Sosiaaliturva-
maksut ovat olleet tutkimusperiodilla kolmesta kuuteen prosenttia yritysten 
palkkasummasta. Tulosten perusteella maksualennus ei aiheuttanut tilastollisesti 
merkitseviä muutoksia mihinkään tutkituista vastemuuttujista. 
Asiasanat: Palkan sivukulut, työvoiman kysyntä, verotuksen kohtaanto 
JEL-luokittelu: J18, J23, J38, J58, J65, J68 
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1. Introduction and background 
The main objective of this project is to estimate by careful empirical analysis the 
average effect of a cut in payroll taxes on employment, wages and firm profit-
ability. This effect is likely to be heterogeneous: different firms, depending on 
their size, capital intensity, worker turnover, etc, will probably experience differ-
ing effects. Mindful of the restrictions of a regionally narrow experiment, it is 
possible to some extent to probe these differentials. The Finnish payroll tax ex-
periment that started in 2003 was originally limited to a three-year period, but its 
extension until 2012 means that firms may well make investment decisions and 
other adjustments targeted at longer time spans. 
There is a rather strong consensus regarding the labour market effects of payroll 
taxes. There is a textbook model stating that a reduction in payroll taxes lowers 
wage costs and hence boosts the demand for labour. Its effect on employment 
then depends on the incidence of the tax. If the tax cut leads to higher wages that 
entirely offset the reduction in taxes, the tax cut will have no effect on employ-
ment, and if the labour supply is fully elastic, then the tax cut will result in higher 
employment. Empirical studies (with micro data and quasi-experimental settings) 
on this subject include Gruber (1994), evaluating the effects of mandated mater-
nity benefits in the US, and Anderson and Meyer (1997) and Murphy (2007), 
who examine the incidence of unemployment insurance taxes. In these cases, the 
changes in payroll tax rates vary between firms because of the different composi-
tion of their labour forces or because the tax rates depend on firm characteristics. 
Another approach is to examine the effects of regional policies that create differ-
ent changes in payroll tax rates between firms that are located in different regions 
but that are otherwise comparable. Prime examples include Bohm and Lind 
(1993), who evaluate the employment effects of regional wage subsidies in 
northern Sweden, Johansen and Klette (1998), who examine the effects of re-
gional differences in payroll taxes in Norway, Bennmarker, Mellander and Öckert 
(2009) and Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009), who evaluate the effects of recent 
regional wage subsidy schemes in Sweden and Finland. The general finding of 
these studies is that changes in payroll taxes are partly shifted to wages, with lit-
tle effect on employment1. An exception is Crépon and Desplatz (2002) who 
evaluate payroll tax subsidies for low-wage workers. In this French case, the au-
thors find significant positive effects on the employment of the affected group of 
workers. 
Textbooks, however, say very little on the effect of payroll taxes on firm profit-
ability. In the neoclassical family of labour market models, the zero profit con-
straint seems to void the question altogether. In recent years, empirical 
                                              
1 See Bennmarker et al. for a short review of previous studies. 
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observations have dented these theories to some extent2. In their book on a 
closely related subject, minimum wages3, Card and Krueger (1995) consider the 
possible mechanisms by which changes in minimum wages could affect firms’ 
profits4. Lacking suitable micro data for direct measurement, they use changes in 
firms’ stock market valuations as an indicator of changes in profits. Also, changes 
in minimum wage legislation (or announced changes) are used as instruments to 
identify the effect of minimum wages on stock prices, and the implied change in 
profits is calculated. Card and Kruger find tentative evidence that announced 
rises in minimum wages induce investors to adjust their valuation of firms 
downward. 
The first study on the direct effect of minimum wages on firm profitability is 
Draca, Machin and Van Reenen (2008). They use the introduction of a national 
minimum wage to the UK labour market in 1999 as a quasi-experiment to iden-
tify the effect of a rise in minimum wages on profits. The motivation for their 
study is that in the UK case there was little impact on employment (Machin, 
Manning and Rahman, 2003 and Stewart, 2004) and also little evidence that 
firms were able to pass on higher costs to consumers by increasing prices (excep-
tions here are Aaronson 2001 and Aaronson  and French 2007). Draca et al. find a 
significant reduction in profits and a rise in labour costs owing to the introduction 
of a national minimum wage scheme, but neither employment nor productivity 
changed. They also report that in the longer run the labour cost hike did not seem 
to force the affected firms out of business. 
There have not been any abrupt changes in wage schemes in Finland that could 
be used as instruments to estimate a wage cost effect on firms’ profits. There is, 
however, an ongoing experiment in payroll taxes. In March 2002, the Finnish 
government agreed on a temporary removal of employer contributions to national 
pension insurance and national health insurance for firms operating in 20 target 
municipalities in Lapland and the Turku archipelago. The removal of these con-
tributions lowered payroll taxes for eligible firms by an average of 4.1 percentage 
points. The programme was designed as an experiment with the stated aim of 
evaluating the effect of a cut in payroll taxes on employment in the target region. 
The payroll tax exemption was planned to last for three years, from 1 January 
2003 to 31 December 2005. Already in May 2003, the government had decided 
to start a regional self-government experiment in Kainuu, eastern Finland, begin-
                                              
2 There is a quotation attributed to Paul A. Samuelson that “In economics it takes a theory to kill a theory; 
facts can only dent a theorist’s hide.” 
3 In the part of the wage distribution where minimum wage rules are binding, the effect of minimum 
wages can be considered to be similar to a payroll tax hike. The main difference is that the uneven inci-
dence can cause substitution away from low-wage labour towards both capital and higher-wage labour. 
4 The focus of the book is on the employment effects of minimum wages, but there is a chapter on how 
much profits change. Unlike the payroll tax case, standard economic theory unambiguously implies that 
wage floors have a negative impact on employment (Borjas 2005, Brown 1999). Empirical evidence is 
considerably more mixed; see the comprehensive review by Neumark and Wascher (2007). 
3 
 
 
ning from 2005. That experiment contained a similar provision for lowered pay-
roll taxes as the Lapland experiment and hence the payroll tax experiment was 
expanded and extended until the end of 2009. The experiment has since been ex-
tended further until the end of 2012. 
To sum up the current situation and motivate the need to assess whether payroll 
tax cuts have had an effect on firm profits, I draw the following conclusions. 1) 
According to our previous research of the first two years of the payroll tax ex-
periment, the cut in northern Finland did not seem to have any immediate em-
ployment effects (Korkeamäki and Uusitalo 2009). This finding is supported by 
evidence from other Nordic labour markets. 2) There was some indication of ris-
ing wages, but not 1:1 with respect to the tax break – this is a finding that has 
also been made in Sweden and Norway. From 1) and 2) and supported by the UK 
case of a change in minimum wages, it seems likely that changes in payroll taxes 
could have an effect on firm profitability. Models of incomplete competition 
from the IO literature (Aaronson and French 2007) and matching models from 
the labour market side (e.g. Flinn 2006) can accommodate these profit effects, 
but their size remains an empirical question. 
For this study, I have twice the number of firms in the treatment group compared 
to the earlier research, richer information on firms and more years of observa-
tions. However, I still do not find any effects on employment, wage sum or prof-
its. The wage sum and profits measured in euro terms grew faster in the target 
region of the experiment, whereas the employment gains were negative, but none 
of the effects are statistically significant. The additional information available 
here does make the previous results concerning wages suspect, however – there 
still is a positive and significant wage effect in Lapland, but in Kainuu the effect 
is negative and significant. Certainly, there might have been a region-specific 
shock in Kainuu causing the negative effect, but I found no reason to believe that 
the result for Lapland was trustworthy. 
That there was a tax cut is a fact and it can be observed to have lowered the cost 
of employment. Other results, however, are either non-existent or drowned in the 
standard errors. It is unfortunate that researchers were not consulted in the design 
phase of the experiment. The selection of the target region and the size of the tax 
cut were mainly driven by political feasibility, not by a focus on facilitating reli-
able and conclusive research. 
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2. The experiment, target and control regions and 
firms 
At the turn of the millennium there was an ongoing debate over the relative mer-
its of across-the-board, low-bureaucracy tax cuts and more targeted measures to 
promote employment.  In March 2002, the Finnish government agreed to a tem-
porary removal of employer contributions to national pension insurance and na-
tional health insurance (see Table 1) for firms operating in the 20 target 
municipalities5. The programme was designed as an experiment with the stated 
aim of evaluating the effect of a cut in payroll taxes on employment in the target 
region. The tax cut was designed to fit within the European Union de minimis 
regulations that govern firm subsidies. Therefore the maximum tax cut is 30,000 
euros per year for each firm and the already heavily subsidised industries of agri-
culture, fishing and transport were excluded from the experiment. The payroll tax 
exemption was to continue for three years from January 1 2003 to December 31 
2005. In December 2005, the government extended the duration of the experi-
ment to the end of 2009. The original regional tax experiment is exhaustively 
described in Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009). 
The act on the regional self-government experiment in Kainuu was passed by the 
Finnish parliament in February 2003 and the experiment started on 1 January 
2005. The aim of the self-government experiment is to gain experience of the 
effects of regional self-government on regional development work, basic ser-
vices, citizen activity, the relationship between regional and state central gov-
ernment as well as between municipal and state local government. The Kainuu 
experiment provides the same payroll tax cut as the Lapland experiment but it is 
no longer motivated in the law as being an experiment nor is there any specific 
mention of an evaluation of the tax cut. The Kainuu experiment extends the pay-
roll tax cut to public sector employers and this provision was extended to Lap-
land from the beginning of 2006. 
The Kainuu region has nine municipalities with an area nearly equalling that of 
Belgium, but a population of only 85,000. The target region in Lapland is even 
larger in area, with a population of 65,000. Both can be described as sparsely 
populated, high unemployment regions with little manufacturing or other indus-
trial activity. The share employed in agriculture and forestry is much higher and 
the average level of education much lower than in the rest of the country. The 
biggest employer is local government. 
                                              
5 The target region for the original experiment was 14 municipalities in Lapland and six municipalities on 
the islands off the south-west coast of Finland. 
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2.1 Finnish payroll taxes 
Payroll taxes in Finland consist of employer contributions to the employees’ pen-
sion scheme, national pension insurance, national health insurance, employment 
accident insurance, and unemployment insurance. The tax rates for the various 
components vary across sectors and by firm size, and firms’ pension contribu-
tions depend on the characteristics of their employees. The components of the 
payroll tax and their evolution over the 15 years from 1995 to 2009 are presented 
in Table 1. The largest component - contributions to the employees’ pension 
scheme - has remained stable, while the other components have gradually been 
lowered after the recession in the early 1990s. 
Table 1 The components of Finnish payroll taxes, percentage of the wage 
sum 
  National pension insurance + 
national health insurance 
 Unemployment 
insurance 
 Total 
Date of 
change 
Employees’ 
pension 
scheme 
I II III Accident 
insurance
Part of 
wage bill 
under € 
840,940 
Part of 
wage bill 
over € 
840,940 
Group 
life in-
surance 
Low High 
1.1.1995 16.60 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.2 2.00 6.10 0.120 23.920 30.520
1.1.1996 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.2 1.00 4.00 0.100 23.100 28.600
1.1.1997 16.70 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.4 1.00 4.00 0.090 23.190 28.690
1.1.1998 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.4 0.90 3.90 0.080 23.180 28.680
1.1.1999 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.3 0.90 3.85 0.080 23.080 28.530
1.1.2000 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.2 0.90 3.45 0.090 22.990 28.040
1.7.2000 16.80 3.600 5.600 6.500 1.2 0.90 3.45 0.090 22.590 28.040
1.1.2001 16.60 3.600 5.600 6.500 1.2 0.80 3.10 0.095 22.295 27.495
1.1.2002 16.70 3.600 5.600 6.500 1.1 0.70 2.70 0.095 22.185 27.085
1.3.2002 16.70 2.950 5.150 6.050 1.1 0.70 2.70 0.095 21.535 26.635
1.1.2003 16.80 2.964 5.164 6.064 1.1 0.60 2.45 0.081 21.545 26.495
1.1.2004 16.80 2.964 5.164 6.064 1.1 0.60 2.50 0.080 21.544 26.544
1.1.2005 16.80 2.966 5.166 6.066 1.2 0.70 2.80 0.080 21.746 26.946
1.1.2006 16.70 2.958 5.158 6.058 1.1 0.75 2.95 0.080 21.588 26.888
1.1.2007 16.64 2.951 5.151 6.051 1.1 0.75 2.95 0.080 21.521 26.821
1.1.2008 16.80 2.771 4.971 5.871 1.0 0.70 2.90 0.080 21.351 26.651
1.1.2009 16.80 2.801 5.001 5.901 1.0 0.65 2.70 0.070 21.321 26.471
1.4.2009 16.80 2.000 4.201 5.101 1.0 0.65 2.70 0.070 20.520 25.671
Notes: contribution to employees’ pension scheme is the average percentage share. The actual contribu-
tion depends on firm size and the characteristics of employees. The cost of accident insurance is also an 
average. 
 
2.2 Target and control regions used in the evaluation 
In our evaluation of the beginning of the Lapland experiment, the comparison 
region we chose was in northern Finland in an area with municipalities with simi-
lar economic and demographic conditions to those in the original target region. 
However, the core of our comparison region was Kainuu. Therefore, it became 
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necessary to select a new region to work as a counterfactual for the larger ex-
periment region. 
Rather than hand-picking municipalities, I followed Bennmarker et al. and used 
the national firm subsidy rules to find an area where the operating environment 
for firms is comparable to the target region. The target region is contained in the 
two highest subsidy regions for the period 2000–2006 and in the highest category 
for 2007–2013. In the first period, firms in the Kainuu region and its surround-
ings to the west and south were eligible for the highest subsidies, with Lapland 
belonging to the second category. There was, however, a special provision for 
Lapland that granted firms almost the same investment and other subsidies as for 
firms in the first category6. The subsidy regimes were allocated according to EU 
rules, where the main factor was the level of NUTS3 region GDP per capita rela-
tive to the EU average – regions with less than 75% of the average were eligible 
for the highest subsidies. 
The comparison region is formed of the non-target municipalities of the two 
highest subsidy regions for the period 2000–2006. I have excluded the largest 
local administrative centres and university towns (Rovaniemi, Joensuu, Kuopio 
and Mikkeli) and one highly industrialised region (Kemi-Tornio) as there is noth-
ing comparable in the target region. Figure 1 shows the regions on a map. I de-
cided to drop the target region in the archipelago from this evaluation since it 
would have been hard to find a credible comparison for this very distinct group 
of municipalities. 
Table 2 highlights some important similarities and differences between the target 
and comparison regions and contrasts them with the rest of the country. The fig-
ures are from 2001, i.e. before the experiment had begun, but the main features 
are quite persistent through the whole period under evaluation. First, the part of 
Lapland that received the tax cut and Kainuu are very sparsely populated. The 
comparison region has more than four times as many inhabitants per square 
kilometre. However, the rest of Finland is more than five times as densely popu-
lated than the comparison region. Second, the population in both the target and 
control regions is declining and not growing. It is also older and less educated 
than the rest of the country. Third, the employment rate was markedly lower (and 
unemployment rate higher) in the target and control regions than in other parts of 
Finland. The share of municipal employees is particularly high in the Lapland 
and Kainuu regions and the share in the control region does not quite match that. 
The employment share of manufacturing is clearly lower in the target region but 
the shares of other industries are well aligned. I will look at the industry compo-
sition more closely when I describe the firms in the target and control regions. 
                                              
6 The subsidy scheme is quite complex (details in the Aid to Business Act, 1200/2000). To simplify, the 
highest share of investment subsidies in category I is 40% and in the northern part (Lapland) of category 
II it is 34% of the total investment.  
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Last, if we consider the public finance situation in the region that received the tax 
cut, we can see that the target and control regions are very alike: both are heavily 
dependent on state grants to finance their public sector. 
Table 2 Target and control regions in 2001 
 Target Control Rest of Finland 
Population  
Total population 153,452 522,418 4,500,946 
Population density 1) 1.56 6.54 35.94 
Population growth, % / a -1.80 -0.98 0.48 
Percentage pensioners 26.96 27.78 21.01 
Dependency ratio 1.94 1.85 1.28 
Secondary education, % 2) 38.15 37.60 35.68 
University level education, % 16.72 15.40 25.14 
Employment  
Employment rate, % 52.33 55.98 65.70 
Unemployment rate, % 21.05 16.30 11.17 
Municipal employees, % 21.98 18.43 13.47 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing, % 10.02 13.97 3.61 
Manufacturing, % 20.75 25.84 27.00 
Trade, % 9.56 9.16 12.33 
Municipal finance  
State grants, € / person 1,591 1,399 593 
Tax revenue, € / person 2,134 2,007 2,807 
Notes: 1) inhabitants / km2, 2) Persons aged 15 or over with a degree from an upper secondary school, 
vocational or professional education institution, or a university. Source: ALTIKA regional statistics data-
base by Statistics Finland. 
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Figure 1 Target and control regions 
 
Notes: Lapland and Kainuu form the target region of the tax cut. Joensuu, Kemi-Tornio, Kuopio, Mikkeli 
and Rovaniemi are removed from the comparison region. 
Target region in Lapland 
Target region in Kainuu 
Comparison region 
Joensuu, Kemi-Tornio, Kuopio, Mikkeli, Rovaniemi 
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2.3 Target and control firms 
Here I take a short look at the firm population in the tax cut’s target and control 
regions. The first observation is that the firms are small – none of the firms that 
have all of their establishments situated in the combined area of the target and 
control regions has more than 600 employees. Furthermore, none of the firms in 
the target region has over 300 employees. This leads me to make one common 
support-type restriction for the comparison group: I drop a few large firms from 
the control group, as it is unclear if they are comparable to any firms in the target 
area. Other restrictions have to do with EU regulations on firm subsidies (firms 
in agriculture, fisheries and transport are not eligible for the payroll tax cut) and 
the technical properties of the firm and establishment data. I use only observa-
tions for firms that can be reliably linked between different registers and to all of 
their establishments for each year they occur in the datasets. In addition, I require 
that the information from all sources on the key variables is consistent7. 
The main firm-level response variables in this study are employment, wage sum 
and operating profit. Almost all the other variables, e.g. various attributes of the 
firms’ workforces and financial position, are more or less endogenous and hence 
cannot be used as explanatory variables. Were this a matching exercise, however, 
these and other pre-experiment firm characteristics would be used to first match 
and then to assess the quality of the matches. Therefore, I gauge the validity of 
the quasi-experimental setting in a similar manner by comparing the target area 
and control area firm populations. The only control variables in the regressions I 
run are industry and firm age group dummies. Even though the difference-in-
differences set-up should remove time-constant firm-specific (and hence region-
specific) differences in levels, dissimilarities in industry growth trends should be 
taken into account if there are differences in the industry distributions between 
the target and control region firm populations.  I report these distributions in Ta-
ble 3. In addition to the distributions, I also calculated a normalised difference for 
each industry share: Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) consider this a good measure 
to evaluate whether the regression methods are well suited to estimate the treat-
ment effects. Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming) argue that normalised differences 
exceeding one quarter in absolute value would probably indicate problems. I also 
calculated a t-statistic for each variable. If this is a reasonable thing to do for a set 
of inter-related dummies might be questioned, but in the case of the industry dis-
tributions, it is not of importance if they differ in a statistically significant man-
ner. The main point is to show that the distributions are similar enough that after 
controlling for industry the comparison between regions is internally valid.  
                                              
7 Observations are dropped if there is conflicting information on the same variable from different sources. 
For example, if according to Financial Statements data a firm has three establishments but not all of those 
are given in the Business Register, or if there are large discrepancies in total wages or turnover from dif-
ferent sources, the observation is removed. 
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Table 3 Industry distribution of target and control region firms in 2001 
 Target Control 
Normalised 
difference t-statistic
Mining and quarrying 0.011 0.020 -0.054 -4.39
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.021 0.021 0.002 0.12
Clothes, etc. 0.009 0.010 -0.005 -0.40
Wood, paper, etc. 0.042 0.040 0.006 0.45
Petro-chemical, etc. 0.002 0.004 -0.022 -1.83
Non-metallic mineral products 0.007 0.008 -0.008 -0.65
All metal industries, except  0.037 0.063 -0.085 -6.83
Electronic and optical products 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.03
Water and electricity supply 0.011 0.011 -0.002 -0.14
Construction 0.147 0.170 -0.044 -3.41
Trade of gasoline, repair & trade of motor vehicles 0.044 0.054 -0.031 -2.38
Wholesale and retail trade 0.180 0.175 0.008 0.62
Accommodation and restaurants 0.103 0.071 0.079 5.73
Information and communication 0.126 0.100 0.060 4.38
Finance and banking 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.53
Business services 0.129 0.128 0.001 0.07
Other services 0.125 0.116 0.020 1.46
Notes: Normalised difference is the difference in sample means scaled by the root of the sum of the sam-
ple variances, i.e. 
2 2
T C
x
T C
X X
S S
 

and 
2 2
T C
T T C C
X X
t
S N S N


. Subscript T refers to the target group and 
C to the control group. 
According to Table 3 there are some statistically significant differences in the 
industry dummies but the standardised differences are well under the aforemen-
tioned 0.25 in absolute value. Table 4 reports the pre-experiment values of the 
dependent variables (and turnover). Here it might be argued that the t-statistic is 
the more interesting measure. If, indeed, there are significant differences (in dif-
ferences) in the main outcomes immediately before the experiment, a possible 
point of concern is whether controlling for firm fixed effects is enough to make 
causal inferences on the effects of the tax cut valid. In Table 4 there are no statis-
tically significant differences at the one per cent risk level. The target region 
firms are somewhat smaller and their growth two years prior to the start of the 
experiment in Lapland was a little slower than in the control region. Even if this 
difference is not significant, this might call for the use of firm-specific slopes in 
the regressions. 
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Table 4 Pre-reform comparison of key variables for target and control 
region firms 
 
Mean  
target 
Mean 
control 
Normalised 
difference t-value
N obs. 
target 
N obs. 
control 
Employment 1)   
2001 3.40 3.70 -0.022 -1.56 2,933 8,851 
2000 3.40 3.69 -0.022 -1.54 2,894 8,620 
1999 3.41 3.65 -0.019 -1.31 2,707 8,117 
Employment growth 2)   
2000–2001 0.01 0.00 0.002 0.13 2,665 8,006 
1999–2000 0.04 0.13 -0.028 -1.78 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 0.05 0.12 -0.019 -1.22 2,453 7,469 
Wage sum, €   
2001 76,756 79,493 -0.007 -0.42 3,029 9,076 
2000 69,862 76,164 -0.019 -1.29 2,894 8,620 
1999 66,878 72,526 -0.018 -1.19 2,707 8,117 
Wage sum growth   
2000–2001 8,652 4,500 0.018 0.96 2,761 8,231 
1999–2000 4,096 5,857 -0.023 -1.38 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 13,459 9,824 0.014 0.74 2,540 7,664 
Turnover   
2001 466,197 497,373 -0.009 -0.59 2,933 8,851 
2000 464,644 474,579 -0.003 -0.16 2,894 8,620 
1999 433,121 457,062 -0.007 -0.44 2,707 8,117 
Turnover growth   
2000–2001 2,671 25,464 -0.024 -1.39 2,665 8,006 
1999–2000 32,366 32,945 -0.001 -0.04 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 41,601 58,119 -0.018 -1.13 2,453 7,469 
Operating profit   
2001 47,418 43,745 0.007 0.41 2,933 8,851 
2000 57,472 42,665 0.015 0.83 2,894 8,620 
1999 45,208 40,667 0.011 0.61 2,707 8,117 
Operating profit growth   
2000–2001 -10,349 957 -0.021 -1.08 2,665 8,006 
1999–2000 13,560 3,201 0.016 0.80 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 4,396 4,901 -0.003 -0.15 2,453 7,469 
Notes: 1) Employment as in the Financial Statements data. 2) Measured in levels. All other growth vari-
ables are also in levels, not percentages. For the definition of the normalised difference and t-statistic, see 
Table 3. 
The numbers in Table 4 are in levels but a reproduction of the table in logs yields 
qualitatively similar numbers, only with smaller (less significant) differences be-
tween the groups. A more rigorous way to look into the validity of the target-
control grouping is to estimate the treatment effect model with dummy experi-
ments for the pre-treatment years. This is done in the robustness checks section 
of the results chapter. 
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3. Data sets 
The primary data sources are the company panel of Statistics Finland’s Finnish 
Linked Employer Employee Data (FLEED), Business Register and the Structure 
of Earnings data. The FLEED company panel is compiled from the Financial 
Statements data and the information content is harmonised over the years. The 
company panel covers almost all active firms in Finland. The Business Register 
contains basic information on all establishments and firms. 
The information on financial statements and balance sheets in the firm data come 
mainly from the tax authorities and are checked for consistency by Statistics 
Finland. The employment measure, the number of employees on a firm’s payroll 
over the calendar year, which we used in our previous study, also came from the 
tax register. In this study, I use an alternative measure, the number of employees 
in the firm in the last week of the year. This is calculated from the FLEED em-
ployee panel8 and was not previously available for the relevant years. I consider 
the cross section information on employment a more reliable measure of a firm's 
average annual employment than the tax register number. The Business Register 
data is used mainly to identify firms that reside entirely in either the target or 
comparison region of this study, i.e. that all establishments of a given firm are in 
the same area. That enables me to keep the multi-establishment firms in the data. 
There are only a few of those but as they are large firms, it is potentially impor-
tant to keep them in the data instead of dropping them altogether. In principle, the 
firms with establishments both in the experiment and control regions would be 
very interesting cases but there are very few of those in the data and they are 
dropped from the sample. 
The Structure of Earnings data come from Statistics Finland’s data on wages and 
salaries, which is compiled by combining data collected by employer organisa-
tions from their members with those from Statistics Finland’s own wage and sal-
ary survey. The Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) collects comprehensive 
wage data from all of its member firms in October of each year. The data consists 
of complete payroll information, excluding top management and owners of the 
firms. EK member firms cover ~70% of Finnish GDP and have ~950,000 em-
ployees. The number of employees in EK member firms represents approxi-
mately half of entire private sector employment (~1.8 million in 2009). The 
Statistics Finland wage survey is sample-based and stratified by size category 
and industry classification. Wage and salary data on employees are collected 
from October. Only firms with five or more employees are sampled and the sam-
ple covers ~10% of workers in unorganised firms. The Structure of Earnings 
                                              
8 The employee panel includes the total working age population in Finland. The firm panel also has an 
employment measure: average full-time equivalent yearly labour force. However, that number is imputed 
for most of the small firms and hence is not applicable in this study. 
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wage data covers all organised employers and is representative of unorganised 
employers. However, while the firm level data consists of near-complete firm 
populations, the Structure of Earnings data is much more limited in scope. The 
wage data covers ~5% of the target region firms and ~20% of the target region 
employees and the samples are by no means random. There is also quite a lot of 
yearly variation in the number of wage records per firm. Compared to the firms’ 
personnel as calculated from the FLEED worker panel, or what is stated in the 
firm register, it seems that for some years much of the personnel of some firms is 
missing. Therefore, the validity of the wage data is not as good as the firm data. 
On the other hand, the quality of the information on wages should be very good, 
and much better than a proxy calculated from the firm data. As long as the 
method of selection into the dataset does not vary between the regions (it should 
not), comparisons should be possible. Information on hours is less accurately 
measured. It is calculated as 4.345 times the regular weekly hours plus overtime. 
The reporting of overtime varies, and for employees with a monthly salary (two 
thirds of the wage data) it might be a more error-prone measure than for the 
workers paid by the hour. 
The datasets are available for research in the research laboratory of Statistics 
Finland. 
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4. Identification 
The starting point for estimating the effect of the payroll tax reduction on firm- 
(or individual-) level responses yi  is a regression 
 ,  1,..., ,it i t it it ity c w u t T      x γ  (1) 
where λt are year effects, wit indexes the treatment9, xit are the firm-level control 
variables, ci is the firm fixed effect and uit are the idiosyncratic errors10. Estima-
tion by FE or first differencing to remove ci is standard if the treatment is uncor-
related with uit. Removing firm fixed effects would also remove any systematic 
differences between the treatment and control groups. While focusing on the 
changes differences away pre-existing dissimilarities between the target and con-
trol regions, it is still possible that the target and the control regions experience 
different shocks or display different pre-existing trends in the response variables. 
In particular, differing industrial structures may lead to different timing of the 
business cycle in the control and the target regions. It is easy to add region- or 
industry-specific time trends or their interactions to (1). It is also possible to ac-
count for differing trends for each firm: 
 ,  1,..., .it i i t it it ity c g t w u t T       x γ  (2) 
Equation (2), a random linear trend model, is a special case of a correlated ran-
dom coefficient model, which can be consistently estimated for T ≥ 3 by first dif-
ferencing  
 1,  2,..., ,  where it i t it it it t t ty g w u t T                x γ  (3) 
and then running a fixed effects regression – or by differencing for a second time 
(Wooldridge 2005). 
If assignment to the treatment and comparison groups is a random draw or an 
unconfounded natural experiment, (3) estimated with standard regression meth-
ods will yield unbiased estimates and inference. Donald and Lang (2007), Ber-
trand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), and Hansen (2007a, 2007b) consider a 
case with unobserved group effects that introduce dependencies in the error terms 
between firms within groups (Donald and Lang) or over observations of the same 
units over time (Bertrand & al.), and how these could be dealt with in a setting 
where both the number of groups and observed time periods becomes large (Han-
                                              
9 wit  is a payroll tax cut indicator that is one if firm i gets the tax cut at time t and zero otherwise. 
10 See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), section 5, for a review of programme evaluation methods under 
unconfoundedness and section 6 for the selection in the unobservables case. 
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sen). Not accounting for these group-wise or temporally correlated errors still 
gives the correct treatment effect estimate but invalidates inference. 
In the Finnish tax cut case the number of groups is two or, at a stretch, three. 
Hence, the cluster sample methodology of Donald and Lang is not applicable. 
With two clusters, the cluster effect cannot be estimated and inference on the 
treatment effect estimator is impossible. I argue that in the Finnish case the test 
and control firms, although situated in geographically distinct areas, are actually 
in the same region as defined by firm subsidy rules. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
there would be a group effect large enough to swamp the sampling variance in 
sample means for treatment and control firms. Indeed, the identification (rather 
than the correct inference) of the tax cut effect hinges on the experiment being 
uncorrelated with other shocks in the target or control regions. On the other hand, 
it is likely that observations on the same firm are correlated over time. Therefore, 
I use one of the methods advocated by Bertrand et al. (2004) to take this type of 
error correlation into account. 
In practice I first estimate (1) and (2) without the tax cut indicators. Then I ag-
gregate11 the error terms over the target region firms into pre- and post-treatment 
values and regress these on the treatment indicator, as in Bertrand et al. (2004). 
The treatment indicator is zero for 2001–2002 and one for 2003–2006 in Lapland 
and the indicator is zero over 2001–2004 and one over 2005–2006 in Kainuu. 
These are my preferred estimates reported in the next section. 
I also ran regressions (1) and (2) directly, using policy change indicators for each 
year (2001,…, 2006) separately to better understand the timing of the effects and 
to see if experiments defined in this way obtain significant coefficients in wrong 
years. I comment on these and the other robustness checks in the next section. 
One direct observation is that estimating (1) is not sufficient: there appear to be 
trends in some of the response variables. Therefore, I report only results where 
trends are accounted for. 
The original dataset has information on all relevant variables for the period 
1999–2007. In the regression analysis, I use data on 2001–2006, i.e. from two 
years prior to the start of the experiment in Lapland until the experiment has run 
for two years in the Kainuu region. The main reason for doing this is to avoid 
using years too far from the tax change and thereby avoid mixing up the tax cut 
effect with other possible regionally occurring shocks. Another reason for drop-
ping the year 2007 is the start of yet another regional employment subsidy 
scheme, where the experiment area partly overlaps with both the Kainuu region 
and the comparison region used in this study. 
                                              
11 When the response variable is in levels, the aggregation is done by taking the mean of pre and post 
experiment residuals. In the case of first differenced responses, the aggregate is the sum of pre- and post- 
experiment residuals to capture the aggregate growth in the variables. 
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5. Results 
The impact of the payroll tax cut is explored in this section. To account for the 
potentially heterogeneous effects of the tax cut I consider the results for four 
groups:  
1) all firms that existed12 in 2001, i.e. two years before the experiment 
started and before there was any common knowledge of the experiment, 
2) a group of firms where the most capital-intensive firms and the firms with 
the highest turnover per employee ratio (the firms in the highest quartile 
of either measure) are removed, 
3) firms where the part of payroll taxes to be deducted is well below 
(≤ 25,000) the maximum deduction limit, 30,000 euros a year, before the 
experiment starts (2001 and 2002) and hence face a lowered marginal la-
bour cost and 
4) the intersection of groups 2 and 3. 
Group 1 is the base group and groups 2–4 are formed from it according to the 
above criteria. 
These groupings are designed to focus on groups of firms intuitively the most 
sensitive to changes in labour costs and to ascertain that the possible effect of the 
tax cut is not drowned out by other strategic actions by large firms13. Group 3 is 
probably the most interesting as in this group the tax cut makes hiring an extra 
employee cheaper and the restriction does not severely reduce the number of ob-
servations (see Table 5 for number of observations). 
Some of the response variables are not defined for all observations: there are no 
logarithms for non-positive values, relative changes14 are not defined for two 
consecutive missing values (for two consecutive zeros I set the relative change to 
zero) and for differences one needs two consecutive non-missing observations. I 
choose not to limit the observations to those where all the responses exist and 
therefore, in addition to the groupings, the number of observations differs across 
the response variables. This decision does not affect the estimates much but helps 
to tighten the confidence intervals by making use of all available information. I 
                                              
12 I define existence as having positive turnover and wage sum. 
13For example, one large electronic components supplier in Lapland shifted its entire operation to China, 
resulting in a large employment effect, certainly not related to the experiment. 
14 I use the definition introduced e.g. in Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996, see notes under Table 5. 
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report the number of observations on each response type for employment for the 
aforementioned groupings in Table 5. The numbers for the other response vari-
ables follow these closely and are not reported. 
The most important difference between the measures (levels, logs, differences, 
differences in logs, differences in relative changes) is that for the levels, differ-
ences and differences in relative changes I have added an observation for firm 
exits. Otherwise, the last change in e.g. employment from a positive value to zero 
would be omitted. For logs or changes in logs, this is not possible. 
Table 5 Number of observations on the response variable Employment in 
firm groups 1–4 and number of firms. 
 Number of observations Number of firms 
Group 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Levels    
Target 15,137 8,036 14,829 7,977 2,934 1,602 2,879 1,592 
Control 45,483 26,576 44,451 26,262 8,807 5,257 8,617 5,200 
Logs   
Target 12,518 6,605 12,214 6,549 2,706 1,456 2,651 1,446 
Control 37,949 22,225 36,943 21,922 8,165 4,832 7,975 4,775 
First differences and differences in relative changes#   
Target 14,953 7,922 14,646 7,863 2,934 1,602 2,879 1,592 
Control 44,904 26,197 43,877 25,885 8,801 5,252 8,611 5,195 
Differences in logs   
Target 11,750 6,226 11,447 6,170 2,566 1,375 2,511 1,365 
Control 35,710 20,972 34,710 20,672 7,787 4,603 7,598 4,546 
#) Relative changes calculated as 1
1
12 ( )
t t
t t
X X
P
X X


  , i.e. P ? [–2, 2]. P = 0  when X is zero for periods t –
 1 and t. 
 
5.1 Effect on employment, wage sum and profits 
I start by looking at employment in the firms. Employment is measured as the 
number of workers employed at the end of the year. 
The coefficients of the treatment indicator from regressions where the dependent 
variable is employment are reported in Table 6. The first four columns contain 
estimates from regressions without firm-specific slopes, but there are controls for 
region and industry trends. Columns five to eight are from regressions with firm-
specific slopes. 
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The estimates in Table 6 show no statistically significant effects on employment. 
All estimates where the unit of measurement is employees (row 1) are negative, 
meaning that the aggregate effect for the target region was also negative.  The 
estimates are positive when the response is measured in differences-in-
differences in log employment (without firm-specific trends) and diff-in-diffs in 
percentage terms (with and without firm-specific trends). The differences in 
growth estimators in the lowest row are actually not that small and show the larg-
est “effect” for group 3, but the standard errors are far too large to warrant any 
conclusions regarding positive effects. While the differences in logs and differ-
ences in relative changes measure the same thing, the results differ owing to the 
exclusion of zero employment observations from the logs. 
Table 6 Effect of tax cut on employment in firms 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences -0.019 -0.039 0.034 -0.071 -0.077 -0.049 -0.045 -0.081 
 (0.107) (0.105) (0.078) (0.101) (0.096) (0.101) (0.075) (0.098) 
Differences in logs 0.0017 0.0149 0.0058 0.0140 -0.0141 -0.0017 -0.0102 0.0000 
 (0.0178) (0.0224) (0.0178) (0.0226) (0.0166) (0.0209) (0.0166) (0.0208) 
Differences in 
relative changes# 0.0338 0.0142 0.0369 0.0122 0.0127 0.0066 0.0152 0.0070 
 (0.0297) (0.0386) (0.0302) (0.0388) (0.0273) (0.0353) (0.0277) (0.0354) 
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001,  2) firms where turnover / employee ratio and capital 
intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential payroll tax cut ≤ 25,000 € up till 
2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 3 and 4. 
#) Relative changes are calculated as 1
1
12 ( )
t t
t t
X X
P
X X


  , i.e. P ? [–2, 2]. P = 0  when X is zero for periods 
t – 1, t. All regressions have controls for year effects and firm age. In all regressions without firm fixed 
effects, industry is controlled at the 4-digit level (338 classes in data) to account for industry-specific 
trends. 
Findings from our previous study15 and the findings from other recent studies of 
northern Sweden and Norway showed that a payroll tax cut is likely to push 
wages up. In Table 7 I report the results from regressions on firms’ yearly wage 
sum. None of the estimates is statistically significantly non-zero. The aggregate 
effect on the target area wage sum is positive (group 1, row 1). The estimate 
coming closest to being significant is the diff-in-diffs estimator (2,427 euro) for 
                                              
15 We did not find any statistically significant effects on wage sum but some indication that wage rates 
had risen in service industries. Our earlier estimate for the wage effect, 1,728 euros, was a diff-in-diffs 
five nearest neighbours matching estimator for Lapland for the years 2003 and 2004. Curiously enough, 
here the diff-in-diffs estimator with firm-specific slopes for Lapland (2003–2006) and Kainuu (2005–
2006) is a very close hit: 1,720 euros. 
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group three without firm-specific trends. The differences in relative changes es-
timators that were positive for employment are also positive here, but are smaller. 
Table 7 Effect of tax cut on firms’ wage sum 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences 2,732 56 2,427 -345 1,720 -29 1,425 -414 
 (2,268) (1,660) (1,272) (1,508) (2,038) (1,527) (1,122) (1,309) 
Differences in logs 0.0134 0.0140 0.0117 0.0117 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0001 
 (0.0144) (0.0175) (0.0145) (0.0175) (0.0135) (0.0165) (0.0136) (0.0166) 
Differences in 
relative changes# 0.0306 0.0087 0.0300 0.0086 -0.0007 -0.0214 -0.0002 -0.0192 
 (0.0202) (0.0284) (0.0205) (0.0286) (0.0173) (0.0245) (0.0175) (0.0244) 
See Table 6 for explanatory notes. 
Compared to the wage and employment effects, the detection of profit effects is 
made even harder by the fact that profits is a quantity containing far more idio-
syncratic and time series variation than the wage sum or employment. The meas-
ure for profits I use is operating profit. Due to changes in accounting practises, 
this is the only profit measure in the data that is consistent over time. As operat-
ing profits quite often show negative values (23% of the observations), the taking 
of logs and calculating relative changes is not very meaningful. Therefore, I took 
proportional measures of profits relative to the wage sum. Operating profit rela-
tive to the wage sum does not directly measure the effect of the tax cut on profits 
but gives an indication of whether the tax cut had an effect over and above the 
effect on wages. The estimation results in Table 8 show, again, no statistically 
significant coefficients. 
Table 8 Effect of the tax cut on firms’ operating profit 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences 8,951 1,703 1,283 -297 9,811 2,077 395 27 
 (19,823) (1,921) (1,792) (1,436) (20,353) (1,895) (1,856) (1,377) 
Difference in the 
share of wage sum 0.0265 -0.0140 0.0265 -0.0147 0.0223 0.0053 0.0232 0.0048 
 (0.0297) (0.0276) (0.0298) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0279) (0.0288) 
See Table 6 for explanatory notes. 
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5.2 Effect on wages and hours, individual wage records 
The number of individual wage and hours observations is decent (see Table 9) 
but the number of firms is small compared to the total number of firms. I have 
maintained the same grouping (1–4) as in the previous subsection. The added 
groups are 
5) observations where a worker stayed in the same firm and occupation from t–1 
to t and 
6) firms on 4-digit industry common support, i.e. in industries that are found in 
both the treatment and control areas. 
The main reason for forming group 5 is to reduce noise. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that wage changes often occur in conjunction with a change of 
occupation or employer and therefore such movers should be kept in the data. 
This grouping might also be used to account for different mobility patterns across 
the regions but such differences do not exist. I generated group 6 to account for 
the fact that in the wage data there are a few firms operating in industries that 
were completely lacking in the target (or control) area and thus one could con-
sider these parts of the data incomparable to the other region, even after control-
ling for industry. 
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Table 9 Number of observations on the response variable hourly wages 
in worker-firm groups 1–6. Also a number of individual workers 
and distinct firms in the wage data. 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 
N observations       
Levels & logs    
Target 9,556 2,110 4,271 1,256 4,473 8,270 
Control 38,016 9,916 14,379 5,539 19,910 23,547 
Diffs, diffs in logs, Differences in relative changes   
Target 4,951 988 2,118 598 4,095 4,142 
Control 21,356 4,796 7,157 2,444 18,746 12,897 
   
N individuals   
Levels & logs   
Target 4,004 965 1,973 632 1,944 3,595 
Control 14,846 4,636 6,584 2,874 8,022 9,411 
Diffs, diffs in logs, Differences in relative changes   
Target 2,013 451 946 287 1,813 1,731 
Control 8,242 2,058 3,069 1,110 7,675 5,131 
   
N firms   
Levels & logs   
Target 179 49 151 46 132 158 
Control 561 211 450 180 424 412 
Diffs, diffs in logs, Differences in relative changes   
Target 135 38 109 35 127 122 
Control 412 149 322 123 405 311 
 
The evidence from the wage regressions to back up the earlier result of the tax 
cut being channelled to higher wages is scant. I present the results in Table 10. 
The differences-in-differences estimates without worker fixed effects (left half of 
Table 10) are mostly negative and also statistically significant for group 6, work-
ers in the industry common support, indicating a wage drop of 26 cents per hour, 
or 1.6 percent. When worker-specific slopes are added, all estimates become 
smaller in absolute value but those for group 6 retain their statistical significance. 
Here the standard errors are also tight enough to show that wage changes cannot 
have accommodated any large changes in the firms’ wage sum. 
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Table 10 Effect of tax cut on hourly wages 
Group      Worker fixed effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
First differences   
-0.14 -0.03 -0.03 0.35 -0.19 -0.26 -0.11 -0.23 -0.05 -0.15 -0.10 -0.21
(0.09) (0.35) (0.17) (0.59) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.19) (0.10) (0.30) (0.07) (0.09)
Differences in logs   
-0.0049 -0.0146 -0.0125 0.0010 -0.0072 -0.0162 -0.0020 -0.0089 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0117
(0.0059) (0.0159) (0.0090) (0.0205) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0046) (0.0101) (0.0060) (0.0147) (0.0043) (0.0053)
Differences in relative changes   
-0.0053 -0.0146 -0.0124 0.0003 -0.0074 -0.0159 -0.0020 -0.0085 0.0001 0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0115
(0.0058) (0.0154) (0.0087) (0.0196) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0045) (0.0099) (0.0058) (0.0143) (0.0042) (0.0052)
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001 (positive employment and wage sum), 2) firms where 
turnover / employee ratio and capital intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential 
payroll tax cut ≤ 25,000 € up till 2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 2 and 3, 5) observations where 
worker stayed in the same firm and occupation from t–1 to t, 6) firms on 4-digit industry common sup-
port, i.e.  in industries that are found in the treatment and control areas. 
All regressions have controls for year effects. Industry is controlled up to 16 classes. The individual con-
trols are gender, education level, age and age squared, tenure and indicators for firm or occupation 
change. Occupation is controlled at the 3-digit level (91 classes in the data). 
The wage sum could rise more than employment without changes in hourly 
wages if the hours worked increase. The Structure of earnings data has informa-
tion on monthly hours but how accurately it measures the actual hours worked 
varies across industries and depends on which collective agreement is followed. 
The regression results where the dependent variable is “monthly hours worked” 
are presented in Table 11. The only statistically significant estimates are found 
for group 4 when the measure is diff-in-diffs without employee-specific slopes. 
Most of the estimates measuring proportional changes (differences in logs, dif-
ferences in relative changes) are negative. 
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Table 11 Effect of tax cut on monthly hours* 
Group      Worker fixed effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
First differences   
0.51 2.74 1.07 5.40 0.50 0.02 0.28 0.59 0.63 2.29 0.34 -0.13
(0.72) (1.67) (1.23) (2.30) (0.69) (0.82) (0.50) (0.97) (0.79) (1.56) (0.45) (0.57)
Differences in logs   
-0.0002 -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0019) (0.0061) (0.0026) (0.0075) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0048) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Differences in relative changes#   
-0.0003 -0.0049 -0.0046 -0.0024 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.0019) (0.0059) (0.0026) (0.0072) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0047) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). See Table 
10 for description of the grouping. 
* Hours are calculated as 4.345 times the regular weekly hours + overtime. 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
The payroll tax experiment did not, on average, have a statistically significant 
effect on employment, firms’ wage sum or operating profit at a regional level. It 
might have had a surprisingly negative effect on hourly wages. I did some ro-
bustness checks to scrutinise these results, but first I try to see whether the data 
allows any precise identification of the experiment. 
5.3.1 Where did the money go? 
After finding no clear effects having examined a number of measures of firms’ 
performance, the question arises whether the experiment is too small to register 
in the data at all or if the quality of the data is too poor for the purpose. Compli-
ance on the part of the firms is not a problem. Taking part in the experiment only 
requires firms to notify their local tax office that the firm is not going to pay the 
first 30,000 euros of the combined national pension insurance and national health 
insurance and to report the deducted amount at the end of the calendar year. Ac-
cording to the data from the tax authorities, practically all the firms with employ-
ees in the target area filed a starting declaration. 
The most disaggregated measure in the data containing the waived part of payroll 
taxes (national pension insurance and national health insurance) is called “other 
labour costs”. These labour costs are directly related to the wage sum, excluding 
pension contributions. The waived part is a little over half of this “other labour 
costs” entry. The other half consists mainly of accident, unemployment and 
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group life insurance payments (see Table 1). The exact amount of the reduced 
payroll taxes for each firm would be available from the tax records, but in order 
to see how reliable the firm register data is, I estimated the effect of the payroll 
tax reduction on other labour costs. If it were not visible at all, it would raise a 
serious concern about data quality. The results of these regressions are presented 
in Table 12. 
Table 12 Effect of tax cut on firms’ “other labour costs” 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences -527 -588 -453 -480 -711 -619 -525 -490 
 (341) (187) (159) (168) (307) (176) (146) (159) 
Differences in logs -0.1519 -0.0996 -0.1506 -0.1002 -0.1503 -0.0957 -0.1476 -0.0931 
 (0.0363) (0.0521) (0.0370) (0.0524) (0.0327) (0.0457) (0.0332) (0.0460) 
Differences in 
relative changes# -0.1477 -0.1560 -0.1456 -0.1547 -0.1611 -0.1719 -0.1576 -0.1678 
 (0.0333) (0.0485) (0.0339) (0.0488) (0.0308) (0.0445) (0.0313) (0.0446) 
    
Differences in share 
of wage sum -0.0232 -0.0006 -0.0232 -0.0004  -0.0227 -0.0002 -0.0228 0.0000 
 (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0045)  (0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0043) 
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001,  2) firms where turnover / employee ratio and capital 
intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential payroll tax cut ≤ 25,000 € up till 
2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 3 and 4. 
#) Relative changes are calculated as 1
1
12 ( )
t t
t t
X X
P
X X


  , i.e. P ? [–2, 2]. P = 0  when X is zero for periods 
t – 1, t. All regressions have controls for year effects and firm age. In all regressions without firm fixed 
effects industry is controlled at the 4-digit level (338 classes in data) to account for industry-specific 
trends. 
The “other labour cost” regressions show clear reductions, but the reductions are 
smaller than what one would expect. The diff-in-diffs estimates are approxi-
mately 600 euro, or 2.3% of the wage sum. What is notable, however, is that in 
groups 2 (and 4) the effects in terms of share of the wage sum are very small or 
non-existent. A more careful inspection of the one-year treatment effect regres-
sions shows that there might be a problem with the comparability of the treat-
ment and comparison regions after all: many response variables for the target 
region firms for 2006, especially in Lapland, indicate that some other factors be-
sides the tax experiment are probably driving the differences between the re-
gions. Hence I re-estimated the models for differences so that the treatment in 
Lapland lasted only for two years (as in Kainuu), instead of four. The results of 
this exercise are given in Table 13. Now almost all the effects on other labour 
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costs become larger and more statistically significant – in particular the results 
for groups 2 and 4 change. 
Table 13 Tax cut effect on firms’ “other labour costs”, 2-period treatment 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences -1,264 -870 -1,033 -783  -1,311 -867 -1,044 -783 
 (343) (195) (172) (176)  (297) (180) (160) (163) 
Differences in logs -0.3783 -0.2568 -0.3770 -0.2543  -0.3573 -0.2172 -0.3554 -0.2133 
 (0.0393) (0.0543) (0.0401) (0.0547)  (0.0369) (0.0498) (0.0376) (0.0501) 
Differences in 
relative changes# -0.3340 -0.2826 -0.3291 -0.2790  -0.3354 -0.2833 -0.3301 -0.2779 
 (0.0353) (0.0497) (0.0359) (0.0500)  (0.0330) (0.0462) (0.0335) (0.0464) 
    
Differences in share 
of wage sum -0.0205 -0.0118 -0.0202 -0.0117  -0.0193 -0.0112 -0.0192 -0.0112 
 (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0045)  (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0030) (0.0043) 
Notes: see Table 12 for explanatory notes. 
However, dropping treatment status from the years 2005 and 2006 in Lapland 
does not change the results for any other responses – none of the firm-level re-
sponses becomes statistically significant and the possible negative effect on 
wages remains the same. 
5.3.2 The role of firm exits 
The proportional diff-in-diffs estimator for employment is larger than the 
changes in log’s estimator (Table 6). As the changes in log’s estimator omits the 
effect of firm exits, the result gives an indirect indication that the tax break might 
have helped some firms to continue operating rather than exiting. The yearly 
number and share of exits of firms that existed in 2001 are given in Table 14. The 
definition of exit is based on information in Statistics Finland’s firm and estab-
lishment registers: a real exit occurs during a year if the firm code and all estab-
lishments linked to it at the end of the previous year disappear from the register. 
26 
 
 
Table 14 Share and number of firm exits* in target and control regions 
Lapland Kainuu Control region 
Share of exits # of exits Share of exits # of exits Share of exits # of exits 
2002 0.0267 39 0.0357 51 0.0301 261 
2003 0.0273 38 0.0407 55 0.0249 204 
2004 0.0248 33 0.0317 40 0.0238 186 
2005 0.0252 32 0.0319 38 0.0257 191 
2006 0.0284 34 0.0264 30 0.0274 194 
* Exits are defined based on firm and establishment registers. An exit has occurred if the firm identifier 
and all establishments linked to it disappear from the register in the year following the potential exit. The 
shaded area in the table indicates the tax experiment. 
I estimated the effect of the tax experiment on exits using a Cox proportional 
hazards model where I controlled for the treatment area (Lapland and Kainuu 
separately), industry and the firm’s age group. The coefficient of interest is the 
tax cut indicator. I used first the same dataset as in the regressions on employ-
ment. Then I estimated the model for an extended time period where I included 
all firms functional in 1999 in order to have more pre-experiment years for Lap-
land. The effects of the tax cut on firm exits are similar and they are not statisti-
cally significant in either case. I report the results only for the 2001–2006 period 
(see Table 15). 
Table 15 Effect of tax cut on firms’ exit probability. Odds ratios from 
proportional hazards model. 
Group 
1 2 3 4 
0.9193 1.0382 0.9090 1.0253
(0.1097) (0.1486) (0.1093) (0.1469)
Notes: Odds ratios in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001,  2) firms where turnover / employee ratio and capital 
intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential payroll tax cut ≤ 25,000 € up till 
2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 3 and 4. 
The use of a stock sample, i.e. firms that exist in a certain time period, would be 
problematic if my interest was in the duration dependence of firm survival. Here 
the focus is on the effect of the tax cut on the existing firm population and hence 
the oversampling of long-standing firms would be a different issue. 
5.3.3 Other subgroups 
The results were derived for subgroups that I considered sensible but that were 
somewhat arbitrary. Here I comment on the results for a number of groupings, 
omitting the tables for the sake of brevity. The first group comprises firms that 
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existed throughout the entire observation period of 2001–2006. This is a poten-
tially more stable group of firms, and a group that was exposed to the experiment 
for the longest time span. This kind of constraint also excludes exiting firms from 
the sample. On the one hand, exits most definitely belong to the data as a vital 
part of firm dynamics. On the other hand, exits of large firms could have a sub-
stantial effect on total employment in the region and it could be argued that relo-
cating a manufacturing firm to China or Estonia is not directly related to small 
changes in payroll taxes. Therefore excluding these events would be justified. 
These results, however, are very close to those obtained for group 1. If one were 
to look very carefully, the drop in the other labour cost variable is largest and the 
rise in the wage sum biggest in this group, but the differences are small. 
To account for the fact that the wage regressions were run on a small subgroup of 
the firm data, I also ran the firm-level regressions for the same subgroup of firm-
year observations that occur in the wage data. The possibly negative wage effect 
is indeed mirrored in these results. Most of the coefficients in the wage sum re-
gressions are negative but do not differ significantly from zero. The estimates of 
changes in operating profit are much larger than for the complete firm data. Ow-
ing to the small sample size, none of the effects is statistically significant. 
For two thirds of the workers in the wage data, hourly pay is calculated from 
monthly wages and information on actual hours worked. If the information on 
hours were for some reason less reliably recorded than wages for this group, it 
could lead to a blurring of the results. I ran separate regressions for workers with 
hourly wage and monthly salary and the results do not reveal any large differ-
ences. The wage effects (still mostly insignificant) are, however, consistently 
more negative for hourly paid workers and the monthly hours effects are larger 
for salary earners. The difference between the coefficients is insignificant. 
The small firms (group 3) were defined in terms of their pre-experiment payroll 
tax payments. Another way of defining small firms is to use a clear personnel 
limit. If I apply a limit of a maximum of 10 employees on any of the pre-
experiment years, I capture 90% of the firms. They account for almost exactly 
half of the total employment in the target and control area firms. The results for 
this group are very close to the group 3 results. 
The last subgroup I considered was the large firms, defined as being above the 
maximum payroll tax cut for both 2001 and 2002. This is a small group and does 
not weigh too much in the firm level regressions. None of the treatment effects is 
statistically significant for them alone. One reassuring finding amidst the non-
existent effects was that the differences-in-differences estimate with firm-specific 
slopes for the reduction in other labour costs is 23,483 euros for the basic pre-
post estimate and 28,539 euros when the treatment is limited to the two post-
experiment years in Lapland. This gives an indication that the data correctly cap-
tures the maximum tax cut for this group of firms. 
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5.3.4 Yearly (placebo) experiments 
In my regression set-up, the last stage regression is run on observations of one 
pre- and one post-experiment observation per firm. As there are several pre- and 
post- experiment years in the original data, it makes it possible to estimate a 
yearly effect separately for each year. If statistically significant differences ap-
pear even before the experiment started, this could indicate that something other 
than the payroll tax experiment is driving the results. 
Employment. None of the yearly effects is statistically significant. There also 
does not seem to be any pattern to these effects, neither in the aggregates nor if I 
look at Lapland and Kainuu separately. 
Wage sum. A negative effect on the level of the wage sum can be seen to origi-
nate from a downward trend in treatment area wage sums compared to the con-
trol area. The estimates for the first observation years are positive and the 
estimates decline year by year. None of the one-year estimates for first differ-
enced responses is statistically significant. 
Operating profit. None of the one-year effects is statistically significant. The 
diff-in-diffs-type estimates are greatest and positive for the start year of the ex-
periment (2003 in Lapland and 2005 in Kainuu), giving some weak evidence that 
the firms might have pocketed the savings. 
Hourly wage. The significant and negative effect obtained for the industry com-
mon support group (group 6 in Table 10) originates from the year the experiment 
started in Kainuu (2005), where there was a clear overall wage drop of three and 
a half per cent. In Lapland, however, there is a positive effect of 1.7 per cent in 
2003 – after a negative and significant effect of 3.4 per cent in 2002. The other 
one-year effects are not statistically significant. That the negative effect occurs 
only in Kainuu and that there are statistically significant effects in “wrong” years 
implies that the observed negative effect has probably more to do with Kainuu-
specific firm dynamics than with the payroll tax experiment. 
The overall conclusion from the yearly effect exercise is that a) in most cases the 
standard errors are large compared to the pre-post regressions and b) the results 
for profits and wage sum give (very weak) support to the previous findings in the 
sense that the timing of the effects seems correct and c) the negative trend in the 
level of the wage sum implies that the firm- or region-specific trends are impor-
tant and the fixed effects regressions on levels and logs are mis-specified. 
5.3.5 Heterogeneous treatment 
The size of the tax cut depends on the payroll tax class of the firm and could vary 
from three to six per cent of the wage sum, up to the maximum reduction of 
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30,000 euros. It would therefore appear reasonable to use the actual reduction 
percentage as the treatment, not just a dummy for being in the target region. Al-
most all of the small firms (groups 2–4) belong to the lowest payroll tax category, 
however, and even though I can classify the larger firms quite accurately into the 
right categories, there are bound to be some errors. That makes the usefulness of 
differentiated treatment level assignment less useful than it first appears. The ac-
tual percentage reduction in payroll taxes is also endogenous for the large firms, 
where the tax cut is topped at 30,000 euros, since it depends on the observed 
wage sum. I ran the regressions with the percentage reduction as the treatment 
but the results were almost identical with those obtained with a treatment indica-
tor. 
5.3.6 Lapland and Kainuu as separate experiments 
I estimated models separately for the Lapland and Kainuu regions, keeping the 
comparison region constant. Keeping in mind the results for the “other labour 
costs” regression indicating that the year 2006 might be a problem in Lapland, I 
also estimated two-year treatment effects for Lapland. 
The differences between the results concerning employment are small. The esti-
mates for employment effects are close to each other for Lapland and Kainuu and 
none is statistically significant. The effect on the wage sum is larger in Kainuu 
but again not statistically significant, whereas the estimates for changes in oper-
ating profit are larger in Lapland, still without being significantly non-zero. The 
hourly wage regressions reflect the results already reported in the one-year ef-
fects section; there is a negative and significant effect in Kainuu and a positive 
and significant effect in Lapland that cancel each other out, yielding no overall 
effect. This is the largest difference in results compared to the Korkeamäki and 
Uusitalo paper. 
5.3.7 Seasonality of employment and the data 
The employment measure for a firm used in this study is the number of workers 
with an employment relationship with it at the end of the year. The wage sum and 
profit measures are for the accounting period, which is most often the calendar 
year. The wage records are for the October of each year. This time pattern could 
hide some effects in wages and employment. Spring and summer are the high 
seasons for tourism in Kainuu and Lapland and one could argue that a temporary 
reduction in labour costs would have the largest effect on short-term work con-
tracts during the high season. Unfortunately, municipality-level monthly em-
ployment figures are not available. The only source would be the Labour force 
survey, but there the sample size in the treated region is not large enough for this 
purpose. Quarterly employment figures are available to a decent approximation 
of the target and control areas, however, and they show that employment is at its 
lowest in the first quarter, then rises 5–9 per cent for the middle quarters, after 
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which it drops in the last quarter to close to the first quarter value. The pattern 
across regions is stable and similar and does not give rise to any concerns that 
seasonality masks some effects from the experiment. 
5.3.8 Selecting the observation period 
Dropping years from the beginning or the end of the current observation period 
of 2001–2006 has little effect on the results. The aforementioned trouble with 
2006 in Lapland is to some extent present for Kainuu as well. Dropping that year 
lowers all the estimates a little, although none change their sign. Dropping the 
year 2001 has the opposite effect, i.e. the effects become somewhat larger but all 
remain well under the limit of becoming statistically significant. 
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6. Discussion and some conclusions 
The main results of this study are that the payroll tax cut did not have a statisti-
cally significant effect on total employment, the wage sum, profits or wages in 
the target area. Most of the estimates are positive but unfortunately the standard 
errors are so wide that they could accommodate values indicating full shifting of 
the tax cut to either the wage sum, profits or, indeed, to employment. If we look 
at the euro-valued point estimates, the conclusion would be that the wage sum in 
the target region firms rose, employment did not and profits grew the most. Al-
ternatively, if we consider the point estimates of the percentage changes, em-
ployment and the wage sum did grow by an equal amount and profits did not 
react. The only unambiguous finding is that the tax cut can be found from the 
Financial Statements data, although even there there was some uncertainty in the 
case of small and the least capital-intensive firms. 
The effect on hourly wages found in Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009) is not 
found here for the combined target region of Kainuu and Lapland. The effect is 
still found for Lapland – but the estimates for Kainuu would imply a negative 
wage effect. The results also show one statistically significant change in a non-
experiment year and hence do not warrant any strong conclusions. 
Irrespective of the findings from this and other similar experiments in the Nordic 
countries, national pension insurance payments have been gradually lowered 
over recent years. From the beginning of 2010 they were abolished altogether, on 
the grounds that it would be beneficial for employment. There was some debate 
if this was the most effective way to help firms generate jobs, but empirical facts 
had a rather small role in the discussion. This is partly due to a lack of such facts. 
The Finnish payroll tax experiment is a rare example where a tax change is made 
in an experimental setting with the stated aim of facilitating economic research. 
Hence it is important to evaluate it, even if the results tell rather little about the 
effects on employment. This is also an opportunity to gather information on the 
experiment itself to learn more about how possible future experiments should be 
designed and implemented to the greatest scientific advantage. Based on my re-
sults I argue that it is still important to continue experimenting – it is also impor-
tant to pre-evaluate future experiments to see if they are likely to yield accurate 
and reliable results. 
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